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ABSTRACT
This study aims at analyzing the established normative 
structure towards the principle of self-determination of peop­
les and the of principle territorial integrity of states, and 
implications of the Yugoslav crisis to these concepts.
The principle of self-determination has been applied with 
reference to decolonization. The dismemberment of colonical 
empties was legitimized but secession from a UN member 
state was not. The principle of territorial integrity were rela­
ted to the prohibition of use of force againts the territorial 
integrity of a state by external and internal elements. Seces­
sionist attemps are regarded as against the territorial integ­
rity principle.
The Yugoslav crisis has implied that frontiers can only be 
changed through negotiated settlement, if not the principle of 
uti possidetis applies to the case and international community 
have not yet been able to develop international law with a uni­
versal application to the question of which people qualifies for 
self-determination.
IV
ÖZET
Bu çalışma bu güne kadar kurulmuş hukuksal yapı 
doğrultusunda halkların self determinasyonu ile devlet 
ülkesinin bütünlüğü ilkeleri ve Yugoslavya krizinin bu kavram­
lara etkisini incelemeyi amaç edinmiştir.
Self determinasyon ilkesi sömürgelerin bağımsızlığı ile 
ilgili uygulanmıştır. Sömürge imparatorluklarının dağılması 
yasallaştırıldı fakat Birleşmiş Milletler üyesi bir devletten  
ayrılma yasallaştırılmadı. Ülkenin bütünlüğü ilkesi, iç ve dış 
unsurların devletin bütünlüğüne karşı kuvvet kullanımını ya­
saklar ve bununla birlikte ayrılıkçı girişimler ülke bütünlüğü 
ilkesine aykırı addedilmiştir.
Yugoslavya krizi sınırların sadece görüşmeler yolu ile 
değiştirilebileceğini göstermiştir. Eğer bu yolla değiştiri­
lemezse uti possidetis ilkesi uygulanır. Uluslararası hukukta 
hangi halkın self determinasyona yeterli olduğu hakkında ev­
rensel bir uygulama geliştirilememiştir.
ABBREVIATIONS
Art. Article
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
EC European Community
EEC Federal Executive Council
GA General Assembly
la International Court of Justice
OAU Organization of African Unity
Res. Resolution
SC Security Council
UN United Nations
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force
US United States
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
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INTRODUCTION
Background
The principle of national unity and territorial integrity has been 
universally accepted by the international community. African states, 
which were among the leaders in developing the post-1945 "right" of self 
determination in the context of decolonization, have adopted a very nar­
row interpretation of the right in the post colonial context of independen­
ce movements, because of their ethnic heterogenity. Territorial integrity 
of states has been affirmed by the United Nations resolutions. The United 
Nations also found itself using its " peace keeping force" to crush the se­
cession of Katanga. The principle of "uti possidetis" has been accepted 
as part of the international normative practice.
Self-determination of peoples has gained importance with the di­
sintegration of multinational federal structures of Eastern Europe. The 
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and recently Czechoslovakia disintegrated. Fede­
ral entities in those countries, under the concept of "self-determination" 
have chosen to form their own states. Until recently, self-determination 
has been used as a tool for the freedom of peoples living under foreign 
domination, namely the colonies. Self-determination was equated with de­
colonization but the problem arose with claims by the peoples living 
under an already established state. It is clear that when we look at the 
ethnic composition of states, we see that they are not completely homo­
geneous and many people living on those territories are claiming their 
right of self-determination. But the international community of states has 
not accepted such a right other than decolonization process since 1945. 
The only deviation during this period was the secession of East Pakistan 
(Bangladesh) from Pakistan.
Definitions of the Terms
The right of self-determenation is the right of a people living in a 
territory to determine the political and legal status of that territory (1). 
The right of self-determination has two distinct meanings, one being ex­
ternal and the orher one internal. The external meaning of self- 
determination implies claims involving the establishment of a new state 
(2) or choosing the state to which they wish to belong(3), and this right 
must be used without interference or coercion by other states(4). Under 
the UN and state practice since 1960 this has gained the meaning as the 
right to freedomt from a former colonial power (5). If it is not a foreign 
invading power but a native dictator the concept of self-determination 
has nothing to do with the external aspect. If it is a native dictator and 
there is a demand for self-determination, this is regarded as part of the 
domestic affairs of that state and support for such a secessionist de­
mand is regarded as interference in the internal affairs of that state. 
Application of external self-determination may result in the emergence of 
a sovereign independent state, free association with an independent 
state, or integration with an independent state (6).
The internal aspect of self-determination means the right of all 
segments of a population to influence the constitutional and political 
structure of the system under which they live (7). Internal aspect of self- 
determination does not involve claims of the establishment of a new 
state. It involves claims of an entity free of external coercion, claims of a 
people to overthrow their effective rulers and establish a new, authorita­
tive government in the whole of an entity and claims of a group within an 
entity to such protection as autonomy (8).In short, it is the free choice 
of government, namely democracy (9).
Territorial integrity of states means that a state's territory 
which was established according to the rules of International law cannot 
be divided or cannot be the issue of acts which would break it into pie­
ces without the approval of the state concerned. As a logical consequen­
ce all other states have to respect this integrity (10).
Purpose of the Study
Today we are witnessing the resurgence of secessionist nationa­
lism, and there is a challenge to the territorial status quo of the world 
that has been shaped during Cold War years. Prior to the Yugoslav se­
cessionist crisis, it was generally accepted that there were no "cracks" in 
the existing regime of self-determination. The successful independence of 
Croatia and Slovenia were a challenge to the status quo. The Yugoslav 
crisis posed many questions . For example, do these events mean that 
the existing normative regime is on the verge of change? Since many 
existing constitutional structures ban such movements, are these limited 
to those countries that allow secession in their constitutional structures? 
How has the international community interpreted the Yugoslav crisis? 
These are the questions that must be answered.
On the other hand, secessionist self-determination is fraught with 
problems such as indefinite divisibility, as we have seen in Croatia and 
Bosnia. Although the majority decided for independence, minorities are 
also trapped in those countries who also claim independence or, wish to 
unite with another state. Instead of secessionist self-determination, some 
scholars are advocating self-determination in the context of "self­
development" [development of cultural, democratic and minority rights], 
within existing structures instead of secession. Such rights are also inclu­
ded in the CSCE document and the Paris Charter.
In the light of these discussions, the Yugoslav experience gains 
importance. The aim of this research is to inquire whether secessionist 
self-determination has gained a new meaning after these experiences or, 
whether these are limited to ex-communist, eastern European federal 
structures or not. Such problems need to be solved because it is a re­
cent phenomenon that the world has faced unprepared and the existing 
normative structure does not fit to the changes that we confront. 
Through this research, we will try to inquire established normative struc­
ture, the challenges that were faced under the experience of the recent 
Yugoslav crisis and, if possible, try to forecast the future of the concept 
of secessionist aspect of self-determination.
Outline of the Study
The first part of this study is a review of the development of 
self-determination in its historical context. It looks at how the concept of 
self-determination developed and how it was interpreted by the League 
of Nations and the international community. Then we will look at develop­
ments at the United Nations, the process of decolonization and how the 
concept of self-determination was being interpreted prior to the Yugos­
lav case. Concepts, such as whether self-determination is a "right" or 
"principle", "territorial integrity"and "which people qualifies for self- 
determination" and "secession" will be analysed and we will look into how 
the world has reacted to secessionist cases before the Yugoslav expe­
rience. The regional interpretation of self-determination will also be ana­
lyzed from different perspectives. At the end of this part, ways will be 
sought to reconcile the territorial integrity of states with the self deter­
mination of peoples.
The second part starts with the evaluation of the constitutional, 
historical and ethnic charactheristics of the Yugoslav case. This will be 
followed by the internal political developments and the demands of the 
parties in the crisis. The reaction of the international community will be 
analyzed at the organizational and state levels at the end of this chap­
ter and a special emphasis will be given to the European Community and 
states at individual levels.
The last part of the study is devoted to the interpretation of the 
implications of the Yugoslav crisis for international law and we will try to 
make forecasts about the future of the secessionist aspect of self- 
determination in light of previous discussions.
PART ONE
SELF DETERMINATION VS. TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
I The Principle of Self-Determination
1.1 Historical Development
The principle of self-determination owes its existence to at least 
two threads of philosophical thought. The principle of equality of men 
and the idea of social contract between the goverment and the gover­
ned (1 ), Despite these ancient roots, it was not until the birth of democ­
racy in its modern form in the second half of the eighteenth century that 
the idea of self-determination really began to take root. This principle 
first became influential as a result of the 1789 French Revolution when it 
arose in the international thought under the name of "Principe des natio­
nalités," putting forth that every national group had the right to estab­
lish an independent state(2). Historically, the nationalism principle of 
French Revolution had great effects on the dissolution of ethnicly multina­
tional Ottoman empire in the Balkans during nineteenth century. The prin­
ciple of self-determination by national groups developed as a natural co­
rollary of developing nationalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth the 
centuries (3) but it was not until the second half of the twentieth centu­
ry that the principle of self-determination developed with the decoloniza­
tion process.
1.2 Wilson and Lenin
At the beginning of the twentieth century the principle of self- 
determination had begun to take its place in the legal terminology of in­
ternational normative practice. The roots of such a development had 
begun to emerge with the two prominent politicians and thinkers, namely 
Lenin and Woodrow Wilson.
7After World War I, President of the United States, Wilson cham­
pioned the principle of self-determination of peoples. In his own words: 
"No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and ac­
cept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the 
consent of the governed and that no right anywhere exists to hand 
people about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property" 
(4). He also proposed self-determination and territorial revision in 
his"fourteen points." President Wilson's views were partially implemented 
after World War I when the allied powers redrew the map of Europe (5) 
but there was no reference to the possibility of territorial revision, as in 
the League of Nations Covenant (6) and it was not regarded as a legal 
principle (7).
The other person who was championing the principle of self- 
determination was Lenin. Lenin saw self-determination in the context of 
the "national question" which surrounded World War I (8). He regarded 
self-determination as follows: "The right of nations to self-determination 
implies exclusively the right to independence in the political sense, the 
right to free political seperation from the oppressor nation. Specifically, 
this demand for political democracy implies complete freedom to agitate 
for secession. This demand is not equivalent of a demand for seperation, 
fragmentation and the formation of small states. It implies only a consis­
tent expression of struggle againts all national oppression" (9).
Self-determination of peoples was supported by Lenin as its 
exercise would promote the interests of the class struggle. Secession 
was a tactic that must be used to fight against the oppressor nation, 
not to support bourgeois nationalists in oppressed nations and it was a 
tactical, rather than a philosophical decision (10).
81.3 The League of Nations
The principle of self-determination was not specifically mentioned 
in the League of Nations Covenant Art. 22 (1) of the League of Nations 
Covenant refers to the colonies and the territories under the rule of the 
defeated powers. This article refers to the peoples of these territories 
unable as yet to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of 
the modern world" and who were to be placed under the responsibility of 
advanced nations. However there was not any obligation upon adminis­
tering powers to ensure an eventual political independence, namely self- 
determination of peoples (11) and in the Namibia case the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) interpreted this article as "the peoples inhabiting 
the mandated territories would be allowed to exercise a right of self- 
determination at some time in the future" (12) but it did not fix a date 
for the exercise of that right. There was no legal principle under the Lea­
gue arrangement, nor any substantive political support for developing 
the concept of self-determination (13).
In contrast, minority group rights played a prominent role in the 
theory and institutional structure of the League of Nations (14). Special 
minority duties were assumed by Germany and Poland under the "Upper 
Silesian" (1935) settlement and by Finland under the "Aaland Island" 
(1920) award (15). During the interwar years between 1919 and 1939 
there was relatively little practice regarding self-determination in interna­
tional law. Two examples, namely the "Saar Plebiscite" and the"Aaland Is­
land" cases show how the League of Nations interpreted the principle of 
self-determination.
The coal-mining area of the Saar was placed under the administ­
ration of a League of Nations Comission for fifteen years, at the end of 
time which its fate was to be decided by a plebiscite (16). With the ter­
mination of this time (1935) the plebiscite was held, and the inhabitants 
were invited to choose between returning to Germany, uniting with Fran­
ce or the continuance of the League administration (17). The people 
choose to return to Germany.
In the Aaland Island case, two expert committees addressed the 
meaning of self-determination and whether it implied the possibility of se­
cession from an existing state (18) and the committee decided that "po­
sitive international law does not recognize the right of national groups, 
as such, to separate themselves from the state of which they form part 
by the simple expression of a wish, generally speaking, the grant or refu­
sal of the right to a portion of its population of determining its own poli­
tical fate by a plebiscite or by some other method is, exclusively, an att­
ribute of sovereignty of every State which is definitively constituted" 
concluding that it is "incompatible with the very idea of the State as a 
territorial and political unity" (19). In the end Swedish inhabitants were 
not given the right to secede and instead were placed under Finnish so­
vereignty and given certain minority guarantees (20). These two cases 
show how the League of Nations saw the principle of self-determination 
in the context of the settlement of disputes during World War I. The Lea­
gue avoided the interpretation of self-determination as a right to secede, 
and gave attention to minority protection because of the failure of bor­
der adjustments to eliminate minorities and the continuing political insta­
bility of Europe during the inter-war period (21 ).
Thus one can conclude that during the interwar years the princip­
le of self-determination had little to do with the demands of the peoples 
concerned, unless those demands were consistent with the geopolitical
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and strategic interests of the great powers (22) and never spread to 
the vast colonial territories.
1.4 The United Nations
With the establishment of the United Nations Organization a new 
chapter was opened in the development of the concept of self- 
determination. The principle of self-determination was included in the UN 
Charter. Under Art. 1 (2) "to develop friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strenghten uni­
versal peace". Self-determination was mentioned as one of the purposes 
of the United Nations. Art. 55 reiterates this principle as "with a view to 
the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary 
for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples". In the for­
mulation adopted by the UN Charter, the sovereign state and the self- 
determining individual triumphed (23) and the idea that a minority group 
could possess such a right was eclipsed (24). Initially it was not recogni­
zed as a fundamental right of the United Nations regime established in 
1945 (25), but mentioned as a goal that could be attained in the future 
(26) and the Charter spoke of a principle of self-determination and not 
as a legal right. In the formulation of self-determination the idea that a 
minority group could protect its rights was swept aside (27) and there 
was no reference to the possibility of territorial revision (28) and it is im­
portant to note that the UN Chater does not specify who is entitled to 
self-determination (29). A 1945 UN report explained that the principle 
conformed to the purposes of the charter" only insofar as it implied the 
right of self-government, and not the right of secession" (30).
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1.5 Colonial Context
The United Nations was the focal point for heated debates which 
surrounded the development of the principle of self-determination. Its 
rapid expansion was due to the post - 1945 process of decolonization. 
The political pressure was caused by the changing composition of the 
United Nations and it was led to adopt many resolutions due to the new 
Third World members (31) and this was an important factor in the shif­
ting interpretation of the Charter and the development of the right of 
self-determination in international law (32).
Self-determination of peoples has gained momentum with the de­
colonization process. National self-determination was accepted as a sy­
nonym for West European decolonization (33) but the Charter did not 
outlaw colonialism, instead required immediate steps to be taken for in­
dependence, or prescribed armed action against dependent peoples 
Thus, the principle of self-determination was gradually applied to non- 
self-governing and trust territories (34).
The first General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 
1960 on the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples" dealt with this problem. Paragraph 2 of the Dec­
laration states that "all peoples have that right to freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural deve­
lopment" and against Western colonial powers which put forward the de­
velopment level of the peoples as a corollary to independence, set the 
following terms as that of "inadequacy of political, social, economic or 
educational preparedness was not to serve as a pretext for delaying in­
dependence". But the declaration makes a clear distinction between the 
self-determining unit and secessionist demands. The declaration, while re­
cognizing this right only for colonial situations, clearly takes its stand
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against the secessionist movement. This "Colonial Declaration" set the 
terms for the self-determination debate in its emphasis upon the colonial 
context and its opposition to secession and has been regarded by some, 
as constituting a binding interpretation of the Charter of the United Na­
tions (35).
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which 
were proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 16 
December 1966, have adopted. Art. 1 (1) clause 2 of General Assembly 
Resolution 1514 (XV). The principle of self- determination has been app­
lied with reference to decolanization. The dismemberment of colonial em­
pires was legitimized but secession from a UN member state was not.
This was followed by the General Assembly Resolution 2625 
(XXV) of "Declaration on Friendly Relations" on 24 October 1970. During 
the discussions on this resolution, some members, notably the Eastern 
Block countries, particularly the USSR, favoured explicit recognition of a 
right to secession but the majority of the members said that they did 
not recognize secession as a legitimate form of self-determination (36). 
The Declaration states : "To bring speedy end to colonialism, having due 
regard to the freely expressed will of the peoples concerned; and bearing 
in mind that subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and 
exploitation constitutes a violation of the principle of self-determination." 
The people who benefit from such a right are exclusively the peoples 
under colonial rule (37) and the establishment of a sovereign and inde­
pendent state, the free association or integration with an independent 
state or the emergence into any other political status freely determined 
by a people was mentioned as modes of implementing the right of self- 
determination by the people under colonial rule (38). The GA Res 2627
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(XXV) of Decleration on the Occasion of the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of 
the United Nations on 24 October 1970 reaffirmed "the inalienable right 
of all colonial peoples to self-determination" and territories like Namibia, 
Angola, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia and Guinea (Bissau) were desc­
ribed as territories which had this right.
By its resolution 3382 (XXX) of 10 November 1975 the General 
Assembly reaffirmed the importance of the universal realization of the 
right of peoples to self-determination, and of speedy granting of inde­
pendence to colonial countries and peoples as imperative for the enjoy­
ment of human rights, and it further reaffirmed the importance of the le­
gitimacy of the people's struggle for independence, territorial integrity, 
and liberation from colonial and foreign domination by all available 
means, including armed struggle. The importance of this resolution was 
that, "armed struggle" was defined as a legitimate means towards the 
attainment of independence from colonial rule (39).
With G.A. Res of 3101 (XXVIII) of 12 December 1973, UN estab­
lished another criteria for self-determination other than colonial regimes 
According to this, people living under racist regimes have the right to 
self-determination. This resolution was a clear denounciation of the South 
African racist regime's policy and practices of apartheid against the 
black majority there (40).
In the Western Sahara case the International Court of Justice cla­
rified the meaning of self-determination. The ICJ in its advisory opinion de­
fined the principle of self-determination "as a right of peoples and its 
application for the purpose of bringing all colonial situations to a speedy 
end". The Court regarded the principle of self-determination as legal one 
in the context of colonized territories (41).
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In a seperate opinion of the ICJ, Judge Petren expressed that 
"there is no need to recall the place of decolonization, under the aegis of 
the UN, in its present evolution of international law, inspired by a series 
of resolutions of the General Assembly, in particular. Resolution 1514 
(XV), a veritable law of decolonization is on the course of taking shape. 
It derives essentially from the priciple of self-determination of peoples 
proclaimed in the Charter, and it is confirmed by a large number of re­
solutions of the General Assembly (42). Here Judge Petren suggests that 
self-determinations does have a place in international law and refers to 
the law of decolonization as the right to self-determination for colonies 
(43).
1.6 Regional Interpretation
Now it is useful to look at the regional Interpretation of the prin­
ciple of self-determination because as we know, different regions have 
different interpretations of this concept depending on the problems they 
face In this respect the African interpretation has an important place 
together with Muslim and European perpectives.
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) has a specific role in the 
definition of the principle of self-determination in the African context. 
Under the OAU, political self-determination is generally equated with free­
dom from colonial rule (44). The Charter of the OAU does not specifical­
ly mention the right of peoples to self-determination and it talks only 
about the "eradication of all froms of colonialism from Africa" (45).
The African charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Banjul Char­
ter) which was accepted in 1981 and came into force in 1985, and for 
the first time in the history of OAU, it mentioned the principle of self- 
determination in Art. 20(1):"AII peoples shall have the right to existence.
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They shall have the unqestionable and inalienable right to self- 
determination. They shall freely determine their political status and shall 
pursue their economic and social development according to the policy 
they have freely chosen." But this right to self-determination is not vie­
wed, as in Art 20 (1), as an unlimited right. The Banjul Charter sets the 
limits of this right of self-determination, in the same article under clause 
2, as "colonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free them­
selves from the bonds of domination by resorting to any means recogni­
zed by the international community." The Banjul Charter thus describes 
the right of self-determination as unquestionable but limited with regard 
to political self-determination and only to the non-self-governing territo­
ries (46).
The Islamic world interpreted the concept of self-determination 
within its own interests. Muslim states have shown a certain leniency to ­
ward secession when it represented Muslim minorities in non-Muslim 
countries(48). The right of peoples to self-determination has been men­
tioned in the Charter of the Islamic Conference. The Charter of the Isla­
mic Conference, while mentioning its emphasis on the elimination of coloni- 
zation(49), has put special emphasis on the Muslim peoples, within Art 
11/6" to strenghten the struggle of all Muslim peoples with a view to safe­
guarding their dignity, independence and national rights". While the Islamic 
Conference gave support to the Palestinians and the secessionist at­
tempt of Muslims in the Philipines it failed to give support to the Turkish 
Cypriots.
With the Helsinki Final Act, European states have managed to 
form a common policy towards the concept of self-determination. A lt­
hough the Helsinki Act declares its "respect to the equal rights of peop­
les and their right to self determination (their internal and external politi­
16
cal status) it also set the limits to this demand by mentioning tha fth is  
must be in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of 
the UN and with the relevant norms of international law including those 
relating to territorial integrity of states.
1.7 Normative Approach
1.7.1 Principle or Right
One of the most controversial issues in international law since the 
end of World War ll, has been whether self-determination is a right in in­
ternational law or simply a political principle. (49) Since 1945 there is an 
ongoing debate among the scholars in this respect. Saying that self- 
determination is a political principle implies that individual states ought to 
recognize it within their internal management and that the international 
community can use pressure of its opinion to move states in this direc­
tion (50). On the other hand, saying that self-determination is a legal 
right invests the peoples with a right independent of their governing sta­
tes which can indeed be exercised in opposition to those states (51).
Self-determination first emerged as a political principle but with 
the inclusion of this concept in various General Assembly resolutions this 
debate has intensified. Many scholars agree that the inclusion of the con­
cept of self-determination in the Charter of the United Nations does not 
transform the principle into a legal right (52). During the time of Presi­
dent Wilson, it was believed that all ethnic groups determined according 
to language, religion and culture had the right of self-determinaton (53). 
But in our days self-determination is viewed as a right for colonial people 
and cannot be used as a right to secede from an established state by 
an ethic group (54). In the wording of various resolutions concerning the 
decolonization process the resolutions, self-determination has been men­
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tioned as a "right" (55). Although some scholars put forward that the 
use of the word "right" instead of "principle" places self-determination as 
a right (56), it is clear that its interpretation by the world community, 
rather than its wording, is the major criterion in international law.
Many governments and scholars, from all regional and political 
perspectives, accept the right of peoples to self-determination (57). Ho­
wever according to Hurst Hannum, the right to self-determination will un­
doubtedly remain controversial in the context of specific situations, and 
the fundamental question is" whether the international right to self- 
determination has been recognized as applicable outside the context of 
decolonization" (57).
1.7.2 Which People Qualify for Self-Determination
Another major question concerning the concept of self- 
determination is the following one: "which people qualify for self- 
determination." The most important aspect of the principle of self- 
determination is its application to the "people" of a specific territory. 
First of all, those people must live in a non-self-governing territory [UNGA 
Res 1541 (XV)].
One of the main arguments about self-determination was whet­
her this idea was applicable to peoples other than those living in colonial 
territories. The 'people' who will freely determine their own political sta­
tus under the concept of self-determination are exclusively the peoples 
under colonial rule and it was regarded as the right of a majority within 
a colony or state (59). Even some jurists interpreted the law of self- 
determination as the law of decolonization applicable only to the colonial 
territories (60).
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II The Principle of Territorial Integrity
The principle of self-determination of peoples contradicts with the 
principle of territorial integrity of states. The territory of a state compri­
ses a more or less delimited land, internal waters and territorial waters
(61) . Other states have the correlative duty of respecting this base of 
state authority and this is needed to establish an international order
(62) . According to this principle a state which was established according 
to the rules of international law cannot be divided territorially and such 
attempts cannot be made by other states without the consent of that 
state concerned (63). The scope of secession is limited with land 
territory of states. The rules established during the decolonization pro­
cess, were related to the prohibition of use of force against the territo­
rial integrity of a state by external elements and necessary measures 
which would be taken against these attacks(64). With the decolonization 
process, this principle has gained a new meaning and secessionist at­
tempts are regarded as against the territoral integrity principle together 
with external elements.
2.1 The League of Nations and The United Nations
The principle of territorial integrity was accepted for the first 
time as a general rule in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Accor­
ding to Art. 10 of the Covenant, "the Members of the League undertake 
to respect and preserve as against external aggresion, the territorial in­
tegrity and existing political independence of all members of the League".
The same principle has been repeated in the Charter of the Uni­
ted Nations. Art 2(4) of the Charter states that: "All Members shall ref­
rain, in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."
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There was no refence to internal threats against the territorial integrity 
of the member states, both in the Covenant and the Charter. Although 
Art 2(7) of the Charter declares that: "Nothing contained in the present 
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which 
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, "but put an 
exception by declaring that enforcement measures can be applied to 
trust territories which are placed under the trussteeship system of the 
UN (65).
This principle has been reiterated through various UN General As­
sembly Resolutions concerning the decolonization process. The UN Gene­
ral Assembly Res of the" Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples", paragraph 6, states that, "any attempt 
aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the ter­
ritorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and prin­
ciples of the Charter of the United Nations". The seventh and final parag­
raph reiterates" the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial 
integrity" (66). The General Assembly Declaration on the Principles of In­
ternational Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among 
States declares that" nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be cons­
trued as authorising or encouraging any action which would dismember 
or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of 
sovereign and independent states conducting themselves in compliance 
with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as 
described above and thus possessed of a government representing the 
whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race 
creed or colour" (67). The UN GA Res. of 2743 of 16 December 1970 
declared that, " all States shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political in­
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dependence the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any State, " and defined these threats or using force as 
"organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or 
terrorist acts in another State." The GA Res. 40/9 of 8 November 1985 
again called the states, "to refrain in international relations from threat 
or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of any other State", and to settle disputes between them 
through negotiations. From these resolutions the principle of self- 
determination cannot be used against the territorial integrity of states 
by minority groups within those states.
2.2 The UN Approach Towards Territorial Integrity
The UN approach to the principle of self-determination of peoples 
towards secessionist entities shows how the UN interpreted the princip­
le of territorial integrity under such demands.
The secessionist demand of Katanga from Congo did not find 
support in the UN . In the case of Congo, in the province of Katanga, 
seccessionists managed to establish their authority and the provincial 
authorities declared Katanga's secession from Congo with the help of 
the Belgian troops. On July 12 and 13, 1960 the President and Prime Mi­
nister of the Republic of Congo had asked the Secretary-General of the 
UN for the urgent dispatch of military assistance in order to protect 
Congolese national territory (68). The UN Security Council Res 145 
(1960) of 22 July 1960 requested from all states to refrain from any 
action that might undermine the territorial integrity and political indepen­
dence of the Republic of Congo and this resolution authorized the Secre­
tary-General to take all necessary action to this effect. A UN force was 
organized and sent to the Republic of Congo . This force was empowe­
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red to enter the province of Katanga for the restoration of the territo­
rial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Congo (69). 
Pressure by African leaders in particular led to the adoption of the Secu­
rity Councul Res on 21 February and 24 November 1961 giving the UN 
forces the approval of the Council to end the Katangan secession by 
force if necessary (70). Finally, the United Nations "peace keeping forces" 
crushed the secession of Katanga from Congo.
Another example how the UN interpreted this concept is the se­
cession of Bangladesh from Pakistan. The Bengali state was not recogni­
zed by the UN and the member states on the ground of an exceptional 
use of secessionist self-determination (71), however,after the Indian 
army's "fait acompli" (72). The discussions at the UN General Assembly 
did not center around on the right of self-determination but on the pre­
servation of the territorial integrity of Pakistan(73).
2.3 Uti Possidetis and Other Regional Approaches
The principle of uti possidetis, according to which newly establis­
hed states boundaries should follow, those that existed in colonial times, 
first emerged in Latin America in early nineteenth century as a conse­
quence of the independence of the ex-Spanish colonies. This principle 
saught to avoid disputes among the successor states by protecting the 
status quo upon independence and sought to ensure that no territory in 
the continent was to be considered as "terra nullius" and thus potentially 
open for further colonization (74). The principle of uti possidetis has two 
distinct meanings. First, it prevents territorial claims between the states 
and secondly, it defines actions which will dismember the states as illegal 
(75).
22
The African continent has established the pattern in this regard 
during the decolonization period. After independence, they concluded 
that the threat to established governments from external invasion and- 
domestic subversion was so great that the common goal of African uni- 
tiy could only be pursued wiithin the frontiers inherited by the colonial po- 
wers(76). Decolonization process has left Africa with many divisions 
between the same tribes along the borders, Although the priciple of self- 
determination was put forward in Africa, in its application, African states 
interpreted as the principle o f  self-government" and denied the existence 
of self-determination for the different tribes which want to secede(77). 
In 1964, the OAU adopted the resolution of the" Intangibility of Frontiers" 
according to which the member states reaffirmed in Art.3, paragraph 
3, and pledged themselves to respect the frontiers existing in their achie­
vement of national independence(78). The ICJ justified the prinsiple of uti- 
possidetis in the frontier dispute case between Burkino Faso and Mali by 
declaring that" its obvious purpose is to prevent the independence and 
stability of new States being endangered by fractricidal struggles provo­
ked by the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of the admi­
nistering power"(79).
The ICJ went on to state that, an apparent conflict existed bet­
ween the principle of uti possidetis and self-determination, but that Afri­
can states had however decided that the maintenance of the territorial 
status qou is the wisest policy In interpreting the principle of self deter­
mination the principle of uti-possidetis has always been taken into ac- 
count"(80). But the important thing is that the ICJ considered it necessa­
ry to emphasize the general scope of the principle of uti possidetis 
declaring that it had become one of universal application(81).
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An example for the interpretation of territorial integrity by the 
OAU is the secession of Biafra from Nigeria. In May 1967, the military go­
vernor of the Eastern Region announced the secession of this region 
from Nigeria and the formation of the republic of Biafra .In this case the 
UN remained aloof, encouraging the OAU in its mediatory efforts, but 
consistenly supported the territorial integrity of Nigeria (82). The Fourth 
OAU Assembly Meeting in September 1967 discussed the case of Biafra 
and with AHG/Res. 51 (IV). The OAU condemned secession in any member 
state and declared its support for the principle of territorial integrity. 
The principle of self-determination was considered to be inapplicable (83) 
and the war perceived to be an internal affair "(84) The OAU assumed a 
diplomatic role for the restoration of the territorial integrity of Nigeria, 
knowing that the secession of Biafra would set a dangerous precedent 
for the political unity of every African country(85). However, the OAU 
was unable to present a united front, four African states namely Gabon, 
the Ivory Coast, Tanzania and Zambia, which were motivated to a large 
extent by humanitarian motives, recognized Biafra (86).
The OAU adopted AHG/ 54 (v) on September 1968 and called 
upon Member States to refrain from any action detrimental to the 
peace, unity and territorial integrity of Nigeria and it also called upon 
the Biafrans to restore the peace and unity of Nigeria. In September 
1969, the OAU with AHG/Res 58(v) again called for the unity of Nigeria 
as being in the overriding interest of Africa. The Biafran secessionist at­
tempt ended without success and the territorial integrity of Nigeria was 
restored.
The European practice differs from other regional approaches by 
its views on territorial integrity. Under Art 1 of the Final Act of Helsinki, 
they consider that frontiers can be changed, in accordance with interna­
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tional law by peaceful means and by agreement." The case of the unifi­
cation of the Federal Republic of Germany with the German Democratic 
Republic the CSCE set a precedent for revising borders on the basis of 
nationality considerations under the Helsinki principles (87). And with the 
" Charter of Paris" the Europen states committed to refrain from the 
threat or use of force againts the territorial integrity of any state (88).
2.4 Constitutional Law and Territorial Integrity
As in international law, constitutional law also operates in an ad­
verse manner to secession (89) and gives utmost attention to the pre­
servation of the territorial integrity of states. The constitutions of many 
states reaffirm the presevation of territorial integrity (90). For example, 
Art. 3 of the Turkish Constitution states that "the Turkish state is an in­
divisible whole with its territory and nation." This article is protected by 
Art.4 of the Constitution, according to which this article shall not be 
amended, nor shall its amendment be proposed (91).
Only three post 1945 federal constitutions provided a right to 
secession These are; Burma between 1947 and 1974, Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Union(92). The practice of such constitutional rules did not come 
into consideration until the secessionist crisis of Yugoslavia and the di­
sintegration of the Soviet Union. These constitutional provisions were not 
applied automatically and peacefully when there was actually a demand 
for their implementation .When demanded in the USSR by the Federal Bal­
tic Republics, the Red Army crushed attempts ,and in the Yugoslav case 
the central government denied the application of such a right, hence civil 
war erupted. Although such rights were mentioned in the constitutions, 
when it came to interpretation the central governments tried to prevent 
the application of such a right and opted for territorial integrity.
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III How to Reconcile the Two Principles
One of the limitations to the implementation of self-determination 
is the territorial integrity of states (93).Conceptually, self determination 
and secessionism are not opposite to each other. But , in practice, they 
have come to contradict each other when territorial integrity of states 
is corcerned. The demand for self-determination during the decoloniza­
tion process was regarded undesirable by the majority of the world 
community of states. The problem arose with the claim for self- 
determination by many groups for secessionist purposes which threate­
ned the territorial integrity of states. It is clear that secession does not 
conform to the rules of international legitimacy, those fundamental legal 
and political principles that govern the present interstate system and 
membership in that system (94) .Moreover, the failure of international 
law to accomodate a right to secede stems from the fear that seces­
sion would mean international anarchy and that this may lead to at­
tempts to dissociate endorsement of the right of self-determination 
from recognition to a right to secede (95).
In view of these recent developments ,it is obvious that the prin­
ciple of territorial integrity must not serve as a shield for tyrants, dicta­
tors or totalitarian rulers, it must not become a screen behind which 
human deprivations are justified, condoned and perpetuated(96). There 
fore a solution must be found to reconcile the dilemma between territo­
rial integrity and self-determination.
In today's world, the decolonization process is over and the de­
mand for self-determination of peoples has gained new dimensions. Cultu­
ral, economic and political discrimination against ethnic groups are the 
main causes of dissatisfaction. The colonial borders drawn by the empi­
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res paid little attention to tribal, cultural and linguistic lines .These are the 
main reasons for the secessionist demands and threats against the ter­
ritorial integrity of states.
During the decolonization period attention has mainly been given 
to the external aspect of self-determination. When the external aspect of 
self-determination has been recognized in territories other than the colo­
nial territories and applied to todays world, that means that in the near 
future we will encounter thousands of ministates since majority of the 
states are ethnicly heterogeneous. Therefore, the problem is how to sa­
tisfy the demands of these people without violating the territorial integri­
ty of states. The application of the internal aspect of self-determination 
might be a solution to this problem. Through application of the internal 
aspect, these minority groups can influence the constitutuonal and politi­
cal structure of the system under which they live . The internal aspect of 
self-determination involves of a people to overthrow their effective rulers 
and establish a new authorative government in the whole of an entity 
and claims of a group within an entity, to such protection as autonomy. 
By application of this democratic process these groups will take position 
in the governmental apparatus and seek solution for their problems. To 
the extent that the internal self-determination gives a clear answer to 
the problems of these dissatisfied groups' problems, it also resists se­
cession as its solution and through this process territorial integrity of 
states and self-determination of peoples can be reconciled.
These democratic principles and protection of minority rights 
have to become a general norm which must be binding on every state 
and effective mechanisms must be established through the international 
organizations. If the majority of the world comunity of states have ma­
naged to establish such a worldwide norm then the external aspect of
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self-determination might be used as a threat aganist nondemocratic go­
vernments which do not respect the democratic principles and minority 
rights. Through the application of internal self-determination justice can 
be enhanced in the world through self-government. When the world reac­
hes such a global consensus, it is not only the minority groups , but the 
whole world will benefit from such a consensus, for at least peace will 
come.
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PART TWO
A CASE STUDY : THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS
I Characteristics of Yugoslavia
1.1 History
The ethnic problem in Yugoslavia did not simply emerge after the 
end of Cold W ar. Its roots can be traced through history. Slavs settled 
in Yugoslavia during the sixth and seventh centuries. There were basically 
three Slavic tribes: the Slovenes; the Croats and the Serbs.The Croatian 
and Slovene tribes were influenced by Latin and Germanic political orders 
and cultures and became Roman Catholic (1). To the east lived the Ser­
bian tribes adjacent to the Byzantine world and were likewise influenced 
by the Eastern Orthodox Church and its culture (2).
Situated on the dividing line between the areas of Roman Catholic 
and Eastern Orthodox religious influence, Bosnia and Herzegovina suffe­
red from constant internal turmoil from the tenth to the fiefteenth centu­
ries. This situation was complicated by the introduction of an heretical 
Christian cult - Bogomilism (3) during the twelfth century.
The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was the time of the Otto­
man conquest in the Balkans. In the fifteenth century, Ottomans defeated 
the Serbian Kingdom and then took control of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The Bogomils who suffered from Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox 
suppression voluntarily accepted the Islamic religion. Slovenia and Croatia 
remained tied to the Habsburg Empire. Three great Mediterranean reli­
gious traditions, Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and Sunnite 
Islam, met head on in Yugoslavia. Croatia remained tied to Habsburgs 
and became the battleground of the Ottoman and the Habsburg empi­
res. The Habsburgs invited the Orthodox Serbs, from territories under
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Ottoman rule and settled them in the Eastern parts of Croatia , thus es- 
tablishin the "Military Frontier Province" against the Ottoman Empire (4).
As part of their overall policy toward the conquered Christian 
peoples, the Ottomans transferred almost all civil an authority of the 
former Serbian state to the partriarchs of Pec(5). This was an aspect 
of the so-called millet system, whereby the non-Muslim subjects of the 
Porte were provided with autonomous self-government under their res­
pective religious leaders (6). The non-Muslim millets were subject to their 
own native regulations and not to Islamic Law. It was largely due to the 
influence of the church that the consciousness of the Serbian state and 
national traditions survived (7). The Eastern Orthodox Serbs, Macedo­
nians and Bosnian Muslims were under the rule of Ottoman Empire for 
much of the period between the fourteenth and nineteenth centuries.
By 1878, with the Treaty of Berlin, Serbia gained its independen­
ce. During the ninetenth century some Slovene, Croat, and Serb intellec­
tuals began to advocate the creation of a united and independent South 
Slav (Yugoslav state). At the end of World War I the Western Allied Po­
wers agreed to the concept of a Yugoslav Kingdom to be formed by uni­
ting the South Slav territories of the defeated Austro-Hungarian Empire 
(the successor of the Habsburg Empire) with Serbia, Montenegro and 
northern Macedonia (8).
In 1941, the Yugoslav Kingdom was occupied by Italy and Ger­
many and partitioned among themselves except for Croatia, which beca­
me an independent state with the inclusion of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
its borders. Almost one third of the inhabitants were Serbs and from the 
beginning, the ustase (9) adopted an anti-Serb policy of massacres, ex­
pulsion, and forced conversion to Catholicism. Under the leadership of 
Josip Tito, the Partisans (10) waged war against the invading forces
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and against groups within Yugoslavia that collaborated with the inva­
ding forces.
After the end of World War II, the Partisans took control of the 
country, abolished the monarchy and proclaimed the Federal People's 
Republic of Yugoslavia. The Constitution of 1946 established six consti­
tuent republics corresponding to traditional divisions of the area without 
regard to the ethnic composition of those republics (11) and many mino­
rities were left trapped in those republics like the Serbian minority in 
Croatia and Macedonia.
1.2 Constitutional and Governmental 
Charactheristics
The 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia created a federation of six 
republics, namely: Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Montenegro and Serbia, and two autonomous regions, Kosova and Voj­
vodina (12). The Constitution defines the Socialist Federal Republic of Yu­
goslavia (SFRY) as a federal state, a union of voluntarily united nations 
and their socialist republics, as well as the socialist autonomous provin­
ces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, which are parts of the Socialist Republic of 
Serbia (13). The Constitution's framers bowed to Serbian sensibilities by 
allowing Serbia to retain ultimate sovereignty over these two provinces 
(14). The six federal republics were given the right to self-determination 
and only the nations, Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, Macedo­
nians and Muslims held such rights (15) in the sense that territorial revi­
sion was made possible with the consent of all six republics and the au­
tonomous provinces. Hence, change could come about by way of 
partition only, not through secession (16).
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The autonomous regions which are members of nations whose 
native countries border on Yugoslavia, (namely the Hungarians and Alba­
nians )and members of other nations living permanently in Yugoslavia 
were not given the right of self-determination and secession.
The 1974 Constitution also created a governmental mechanism. 
According to this, a collective federal presidency was established. It was 
composed of representatives from each of the republics, the minister of 
defence (who did not have voting rights) and Tito, who was designated 
"President for Life" (17). A constitutional provision addressed the prob­
lem of Tito's succession by creating a system in which the title of presi­
dent would pass annually in a pre-set sequence from one member of the 
collective body to the next (18). After the death of Tito in May 1980, 
the eight-member presidency of the republic under an annually rotating 
president became head of State; president of Federal Executive Council is 
premier and de facto head of government (19).
1.3 Ethnic Composition
Socialist Yugoslavia was a multinational state in which the 
country's federal status was defined along ethnic lines. There were six 
major nations which were divided within the federal borders. These natio­
nal groups were Serbs 36.3%, Croats 19.8%, Muslims 8.9%, Slovenians 
7.8%, Macedonians 6.0% and Montenegrins 2.6% (20). Minorities, namely 
Hungarians 2% and Albanians 7% of the population were assigned their 
autonomous republics (until 1988-90). But the problem arose with the 
fact that this ethnic distribution did not correspond with republican 
boundaries (21).
-In Croatia, Croats comprise 75%, Serbs 1 2% and other national 
groups comprise 13% of the population.
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-in Bosnia-Hercegovina Muslims comprise 40%, Serbs 33%, 
Croats 18% and other nations 9%,
-in Slovenia, Slovenes make up 90%, Croats 3%, Serbs 2% and 
other nations 5%,
-in Montenegro, Montenegrins 68%, Muslims 1 3%, Albanians 6%, 
Serbs 3% and other nations 10%,
-in Macedonia, Macedonians, 67%, Albanians 20%, Serbians 2% 
and other national groups 11 %,
-in Serbia, Serbs 65%, Albanians 20%, Croats 2% and other na­
tions comprise 13% of the population (22),
-in the autonomous republics of Kosovo, Albanians 90% and 
other nations 10% and in Vojvodina Serbs 56%, Hungarians 21% and 
other nations 23% (23).
I I  The Crisis
2.1 Space Internal Developments
Under Tito's charismatic leadership and the hard norms of the 
Cold War years Yugoslavia survived and existed until the end of the 
1980s (24). The first blow against the existence of Yugoslavia came with 
Tito's death but the Cold War norms prevented the disintegration of the 
Yugoslav Federation and Yugoslavia managed to survive until the end of 
the Cold War.
Five sets of developments prepared the ground for the disinteg­
ration of Yugoslavia between 1989 and 1991: The amendment of republi­
can constitutions without federal approval; the ending of Communist 
Party rule and holding of democratic elections; the inclusion of republican 
presidents in constitutional talks and the subsequent collapse of these 
talks.
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The first seeds of disintegration of Yugoslavia were seen in 1987. 
when Slobodan Milosevic came to power in Serbia with the promise to 
unite Serbia again by ending autonomy for the autonomous provinces of 
Kosovo and Vojvodina (25). Between Autumn 1988 and March 1990, Ko­
sovo and Vojvodina lost their autonomy completely.
In September 1989, Slovenia adopted a series of constitutional 
amendments which asserted republican sovereignty over the federal one. 
The other republics, following the Slovenian example, made similar consti­
tutional amendments (26). Following the constitutional crisis, talks bet­
ween the six republics on Yugoslavia's future constitutional structure 
started. The constitutional discussions that followed revolved around 
two concepts for the future of Yugoslavia: federalism and confederalism. 
A new federation was proposed by Serbia and its proposals were desig­
ned to optimize central control (27), where as confederation was pro­
pounded by Slovenia and Croatia. They wanted Yugoslavia to become a 
loose association of independent and sovereign states similar to the Eu­
ropean Community (28).
The other important point was that in these six federal republics 
national elections were held and in these multi-party elections non­
communist authorities had assumed power and the republics ceased to 
be socialist republics in 1989 and 1990. The holding of multi-party elec­
tions resulted in victories for the communists with nationalist program­
mes in Serbia and Montenegro, and for centre-right parties with nationa­
list programmes in the other republics (29). The results of these 
elections were felt during the talks to reach agreements on the frame­
work for federal elections and in the end these could not be held.
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The governmental crisis gained momentum in 1991. The Macedo­
nian Assembly, on January 25, unanimously adopted a declaration of the 
republic's sovereignty which entitled the Macedonian people to self- 
determination, including the right to secede from Yugoslavia (30). 
Against these declarations. President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, on 
February 8, stated a warning that if Yugoslavia ceased to be a federa­
tion, Serbia would seek to incorporate all Yugoslav areas where ethnic 
Serbs were predominant (31). Despite these threats, on February 20. 
1991, the Slovene assembly adopted a resolution on the "disassociation 
of Slovenia from Yugoslavia" which reinstated all sovereign rights pre­
viously transferred by Slovenia to Yugoslavia, under Slovene control (32). 
This was followed by the Croatian Assembly resolution on February 21 
asserting the primacy of Croatia's constitution and laws over those of 
the federation and the procedure for Yugoslavia's dissolution into sove­
reign states (33). The first reaction from the minorities living in the fede­
ral republics came from Serbs living in Croatia. The Serbs who in late 
1990 declared the "Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina" foresaw the 
region's separation from Croatia on February 28, and adoped a resolu­
tion declaring that Krajina wished to unite with Serbia and Montenegro 
and the Serbian population of Bosnia-Flerzegovina (34).
Until April 1991, the Federal Presidency had the principal role in 
negotiating Yugoslavia's future. But, with the newly elected representati­
ves of these republics, the presidents of Yugoslavia's six constituent re­
publics took over this role from the federal presidency, and on April 11, 
they produced an agreement to hold a referandum on the future of the 
country. Ideas for that structure had crystallized into two models:
35
(i) a community of independent and sovereign states, as advoca­
ted by Slovenia and Croatia,
(ii) a united federal state, as advocated by Serbia and Monte­
negro, in which republics continued to delegate some sovereign rights to 
a central government (35).
It was decided at the Brdo Krajina meeting to hold a seperate 
referendum by the end of May in each republic except Slovenia, which had 
already voted overwhelmingly for independence in a referandum in De­
cember 1990 (36).
The Presidency called for an emergency session on May 8-9 at 
the request of the army (37). In its statement finally agreed early on 
May 9, the Collective State Presidency decided to set up a commission 
including Croatian representatives as well as "legitimate representatives" 
of Serbs from Croatia to investigate the causes of the crisis including 
"the right of a nation to self-determination including secession" (38).
A referandum held on May 19 throughout Croatia, which the 
Serbs boycotted, showed that 93.2 percent of those voted in favour of 
the proposal that Croatia "as a sovereign and independent country 
which guarantees cultural autonomy and all civil rights to the Serbs and 
members of other nationalities in Croatia, may with other republics Join a 
confederation of sovereign states" (39) and the Slovenian government 
announced on May 8 that it would secede by June 26^^ (40).
On June 1 ,Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic condemned as 
illegal the moves by Croatia and Slovenia to secede (41). The leaders of 
Yugoslavia's six constituent republics met in Zagreb on June 6 and ag­
reed to consider a compromise plan to transform the country into a 
loose alliance of sovereign states, based on a proposal put forward by 
the presidents of the republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia 
(42).
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The Presidents of Yugoslavia's six republics on June 6 agreed to 
consider as a basis for future negotiations a proposal to turn the count­
ry into a loose confederation of states (43). A joint statement of presi­
dents read in part, "insisting on Yugoslavia's legally remaining a federal 
state could lead to its definitive breakup. We can preserve only by trans­
forming it into an alliance of Yugoslav republics" (44).
On June 24, Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, Ante Markovic, visited 
Zagreb and addressed the Croatian Assembly. He warned that the fede­
ral government would use "every legal measure" to prevent the break-up 
of Yugoslavia. Following this at an emergency session on June 25, the fe­
deral parliament in Belgrade called on JNA (Yugoslav National Army) to 
intervene to "protect Yugoslavia's borders" (45). Following this declera- 
tion, clashes between JNA and the Slovene forces started.
An FEC (Federal Executive Council) meeting on June 27,called for 
a three month moratorium on the implementation of all decisions concer­
ning secession, dissociation and the changing of international borders 
between republics (46). Croatia and Slovenia proceeded during October 
with steps to dissociate themselves from federal Yugoslav arrange­
ments, refusing to extend beyond October 7, the three month morato­
rium on implementing their independence declarations, to which both had 
agreed at the Brioni talks in July (47). Croat and Slovene representatives 
resigned throughout September and October from the federal bodies 
(48). The parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina declared the republic's sove­
reignty on October 15 (49). Serbian ethnic deputies walked out of the 
session, and on October 24 Formed the "Assembly of the Serbian Nation 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina" fixing a plebiscite on remaining in Yugoslavia 
(50).
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Despite insistence by Serbia that its actions was illegal, the Koso­
vo Assembly (dissolved by Serbian government in July 1990) organized a 
referendum on September 26-30 on sovereignty for the 92 percent Alba­
nian speaking and mostly Muslim province of Kosovo, and proceeded on 
October 19, to elect a provisional coalition government which was recog­
nized on October 22 only by Albania (51).
Serbia on November 5, rejected and EC peace proposal that had 
been tentatively accepted by Yugoslavia's five other republics. The pro­
posal, presented in October at an EC peace conference in The Hague, 
called for Yugoslavia to be transformed into a loose confederation of in­
dependent republics with the traditional internal borders left unchanged
(52) . Each republic would guarantee the civil rights of its ethnic minorities
(53) .
On December 4, the Assembly of Croatia unanimously approved 
a law on minorities, committing Croatia to accept all international con­
vention on human rights and granting cultural autonomy to ethnic com­
munities within Croatia, once there was peace in the republic within its 
1974 borders (54). But the Serbs living in Croatia were not satisfied with 
this and proceeded towards independence. Two Serb enclaves in Croatia, 
the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina and Autonomous Region of 
Slavonia, Branja and Western Srem, proclaimed themselves the Serbian 
Republic of Krajina on December 19 (55). The two enclaves did not share 
a common border, but together occupied about a third of Croation ter­
ritory and included 300.000 people (56). The new republic was recogni­
zed by Serbia the following day (57).
Serbia and Montenegro agreed on February 12 in Titograd to re­
tain "the principles of a common state which would be the continuation
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of Yugoslavia" (58). It would retain the Yugoslav flag and anthem and a 
joint parliament and government, cooperate in foreign policy and defence 
and form an economic union (59). Nevertheless .Montenegro decided to 
hold a referandum on its future on March 1 (60). Serbs living in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina followed the Croatian example, Serbian leaders, on March 
27, proclaimed the "Serbian republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina", declaring 
its loyalty to the "all-Serb state of Yugoslavia" (61). On the other hand, 
Montenegrins voted in favor of the republic, remaining part of Yugoslavia 
(62).
In the end, four federal structures broke away from Yugoslavia, 
while Montenegro and Serbia decided to continue as Yugoslavia. The in­
ternal crisis developed around the problem of minorities. Serbian minori­
ties living in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia demanded their secession 
from already seceding entities. The seceding entities of Croatia and Bos­
nia-Herzegovina have born with their secessionist cases. From the start 
they granted special minority rights to the Serbian minorities but these 
grants have collided with the demands of the Serbian minorities' demand 
to remain part of Serbia. When their grants clashed with the demands of 
Serbian minority and Federal Army got involved in the crisis on the side 
of the Serbs, the civil war erupted. In this crisis, the ambition of the 
Serbs for a "Greater Serbia" together with the historical enmities and 
cultural differences between the various ethnic groups have played a 
prominent role.
2.2 Dealing with the Crisis
A number of international organisations have dealt with the crisis 
in Yugoslavia. Among these international organizations, we can mention 
the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), the Euro­
pean Community, the UN and certain individual states (63).
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2.2.1 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
In late June 1991, Austria became alarmed by developments in 
its southern neighbor and implemented the related procedure through 
the offices of the Center for the Prevention of Conflict, an organ of the 
CSCE which allows a member government to request information on 
"unusual military activities" in another state (64) and on grounds that 
European security was threatened (65). Upon the request of Austria, the 
CSCE emergency mechanism at the session of the Council of Foreign Mi­
nisters in Berlin in June 1991, "expressed friendly concern and support 
for the democratic development, unity and territorial integrity of Yugos­
lavia (66), The statement also declared that the member governments 
support the continuation of dialogue among all parties involved in the 
conflict and that the existing constitutional disputes should be remedied 
away out of the present difficult impasse should be found without re­
course to the use of force and in conformity with legal and constitutional 
procedures" (67). At the beginning of July 1991, the CSCE Committee of 
Senior Officials adopted a resolution. The text backed the EC mediatiory 
efforts, requested that all military forces subordinate themselves to poli­
tical authority and urged Croatia and Slovenia to suspend their declara­
tions of independence for three months (68).
The CSCE Committee of Senior officials held a third emergency 
meeting on the Yugoslav crisis in early September. The member govern­
ments issued a statement in which they declared that "no territorial 
gains or changes within Yugoslavia brought about by violence are accep 
table" (69). But the CSCE never got into the game of Yugoslavia because 
of its limitations that, it is too inclusive and it operates on the basis of
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unanimity (70). The federal government of Yugoslavia which was repre­
sented at those meetings always blocked the CSCE mechanism and the 
Soviet Union also resisted CSCE intervention in Yugoslavia (71), because 
the USSR was trying to prevent its own disintegration. The most the 
CSCE could do in this case was to pass a mandate to the European 
Community (72).
2.2 .2 The United Nations
Initially the UN approach to the crisis had been based on preser­
ving the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. The first reaction of the UN or­
ganization was to impose an arms embargo and express its full support 
for the efforts of the European Community and CSCE mechanism and 
declared that no territorial gains or changes within Yugoslavia brought 
about by violence are acceptable (73). The SC Res. 71 3 of 25 Septem­
ber 1991 also called on " all States to refrain from any action which 
might contribute to increasing tension and impeding or delaying a peace­
ful and negatiated outcome to the conflict in Yugoslavia, which would 
permit all Yugoslavs to decide upon and to construct their future in 
peace", which accepted self- determination of federal entities in Yugosla­
via. During the discussions at the Security Council, there was not a clear 
cut consensus among the members. While the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the Soviet Union, Boris Pankin and the U.S. Secretary of State James 
A. Baker called for negotiation and dialogue between the parties in Yu­
goslavia only two states had taken a clear stand towards the crisis du­
ring the debates the Security Council. But during the debates there were 
two opposite views. While Austrian Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
called for the recognition of the right to self-determination in conformity 
with the full aspirations of the peoples of Yugoslavia, the Chinese Minis­
ter of Foreign Affairs Qian Qichen said that the internal problems of sta­
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tes should be resolved by their governments and that the UN should in 
no way interfere or intervene , but it supported the draft, based on exp­
licit assurance given by Yugoslavia that they would identify common inte­
rests in a new integration (74). As can be seen from the discussions only 
Austria supported the principle of self-determination and other states 
called for negotiations between the parties and favoured the continua­
tion of Yugoslavia as a single entity. The initiative to solve the crisis was 
given to European Community.
As the crisis intensified the EC got into the process of recognition 
of the seceding entities in Yugoslavia. The UN Security Council through 
Res. 724 dated 15 December 1991 declared that it "strongly urges all 
States and parties to refrain from any action which might contribute to 
increasing tension, to inhibiting the establishment of an effective cease­
fire and to impeding or delaying a peaceful and negotiated outcome to 
the conflict in Yugoslavia." Through this resolution, the UN Security Coun­
cil indirectly warned the EC against recognition of Croatia and Slovenia.
The UN involvement in the crisis was not limited with the discus­
sions. The Security Council gave the duty to the Secretary General of the 
UN to examine and take appropriate action for the possible establish­
ment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia (75) and 
the process of the deployment of any United Nations peace-keeping ope­
ration in Yugoslavia was seen as an apparatus to enable all parties to 
settle their disputes peacefully (76). Upon this, the UN prepared a peace­
keeping plan and submitted it to the fighting parties and decided to es­
tablish a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in accordance 
with the peace plan but reaffirmed the parties that the plan and its imp­
lementation is in no way intended to prejudge the terms of a political 
settlement (77). The UNPROFOR has been deployed along the fighting
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areas in Croatia between the Serbs and Croats.
As the fighting began in Bosnia-Herzegovina following consulta­
tions among members of the Security Council, the President of the Coun­
cil made the statement that "the Council demands that all forms of inter­
ference from outside Bosnia-Herzegovina cease immediately. In this 
respect, it specifically calls upon Bosnia-Herzegovina's neighbours to 
exercise all their influence to end such interference" (78). This was a clear 
warning against Serbia and Croatia; and it decided the deployment of 
UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Upon this decision, the UN Security 
Council declared that any change of borders by force is not acceptable 
and respect should be shown to the territorial integrity of Bosnia Herce­
govina (79).
With the admission of Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, 
to the UN, the disintegration process has gained a new dimension (80). 
For the first time the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was equated with 
Serbia and Montenegro and the claim by Serbia and Montenegro to con­
tinue automatically as member of the former Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia has not been generally accepted and was imposed an embar­
go upon Serbia and Montenegro (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) (81). 
But this decision was not taken unanimously, China and Zimbabwe abstai­
ned. Through Res.777 of 19 Sept. 1992 the Security Council decided that 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply 
for membership of the United Nations that it shall not participate in the 
work of the General Assembly. Again China, Zimbabwe and India abstai­
ned. Through this period the UN actively initiated humanitarian relief ope­
rations in Bosnia-Herzegovina but failed to take effective measures for 
the prevention of hostilities between the fighting parties.
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Initially the UN position in the crisis was shaped around finding a 
negotiated settlement to the crisis and, in a way, the continuation of the 
Yugoslav state without any secession. But as the crisis was intensified 
and the EC got into the recognition process, the UN could not do anyt­
hing to prevent this. Then, as can be seen in the resolutions of the Securi­
ty Council, the UN adopted it policies through the process for the deploy­
ment of peace-keeping forces and calling for the respect of the seceding 
countries territorial integrity. Members of the Third World such as China 
and India remained stood aloof towards the secessionist process and 
Zimbabwe also reflecting the African approach in the Security Council 
abstained in recognizing the secession of Yugoslavia.
2.2 .3  European Community
After the failure of the CSCE procedures to find a just solution to 
the Yugoslav crisis, the EC has taken the lead. The EC reluctantly wanted 
to see Yugoslavia's break up and it adopted its policy of continuation of 
a single state. The EC actively sought a solution, first through the media­
tion efforts of the EC foreign minister "troikas" (the foreign ministers of 
Luxembourg, Italy and Netherlands) and then through the conference on 
Yugoslavia set up under former NATO Secretary-General Lord Carring­
ton, following agreement between the parties to the dispute in August 
(82).
But the views of the EC member states were not based on the 
continuation of a single state. Some members of the EC, notably Germa­
ny, from the start threatened to recognize the break-up Yugoslav re­
publics. Germany argued for supporting the sovereignty of Slovenia and 
Croatia with which it had both economic and historical ties (83). In cont­
rast, France, with its own traditional connections with Serbia, held to the
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primacy of sustaining the same Yugoslav federation (84). Despite these 
disparities concerning the views of the member states, initial reaction to 
the Yugoslav crisis organized around the continuation of a single state.
European Community officials first reaction to the crisis was 
that, continuing aid would be conditional upon the country resolving eth­
nic conflicts and furthering economic and political reform and that future 
close relations would depend on the country remaining united (85). In the 
two days of talks in Belgrade on May 30-31, during which Jacques De- 
lors. President of the EC Comission, met with the presidents of the repub­
lics, confirmed that the EC was ready to help a democratized and refor­
med Yugoslavia, with unchanged internal and external borders (86).This 
was a hard position to reconcile with that of Germany.
European Community ministers expressed their feelings on Yugos­
lavia in the Political Cooperation declaration, and on July 5 in the Hague 
EC Foreign ministers pointed out that "it is only for the peoples of Yugos­
lavia themselves to decide on the country's future" and "the community 
and its member States call for a dialogue without preconditions for all 
the parties on the future of Yugoslavia, which should be based on the 
principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter for a 
New Europe, in particular respect for human rights, including rights of mi­
norities and the right of peoples to self-determination in conformity with 
the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of interna­
tional law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States" (87).
The rights of self-determination and the territorial integrity were 
seen by the EC Member States to be in conflict with each other insofar 
as the Slovenian and Croatian moves were the result of unilateral decla­
rations (88) because the EC was favoring a negotiated settlement to
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the crisis between the parties.
At the same time, the EC mediation efforts continued between 
the Yugoslav republics under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington w it­
hout any result. The European Parliament took a different approach to­
wards the crisis in Yugoslavia. It adopted a resolution concerning Yugos­
lavia on 13 March 1991, taking totally different approach by declaring 
that "the constituent republics and autonomous provinces of Yugoslavia 
must have a right freely to determine their own future in a peaceful and 
democratic manner and on the basis of recognized international and in­
ternal borders" (89).
After the clashes began between Croatian and the Serbian for­
ces, ministers declared that, a new situation existed in Yugoslavia on 
September, 1991 and stated:
- The unacceptability of use of force,
- the unacceptability of any change of borders by force which 
they are determined not to use,
- respect for the rights of all who live in Yugoslavia, including mi­
norities,
- the need to take into account of all legitimate concerns and as­
pirations (90).
The original EC plans envisioned the country as a loose federation 
in a currency union, without border changes and with international peace­
keepers overseeing the demilitarization of disputed areas inhabited by 
minorities (91 ). The proposal, presented in October at an EC peace con­
ference in The Hague, called for Yugoslavia to be transformed into a 
loose confederation of independent republics, with the traditional internal
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borders left unchanged. Each republic would guarantee the civil rights of 
its ethnic minorities (92). But as the efforts started to fail and a solution 
could not be found, pressure within the EC, exerted by Germany, for the 
recognition of the breakaway republics intensified. In early November, the 
Conference broke down after Serbia rejected a settlement plan put for­
ward by Carrington (93). There followed a debate within the EC over the 
recognition of the breakaway Yugoslav republics (94).
Upon the proposal made by France, Judge Badinter was given 
the task to prepare a report on the guidelines for the recognition of 
breakaway republics. On 16 December 1991, this plan was approved 
and declared as the "Declaration on the Guidelines on Recognition of New 
States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union".
The EC indicates that they adopt a common position on the pro­
cess of recognition of these new states, which require:
- Respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Na­
tions and the commitments subscribed to in the Final Act of 
Helsinki and the Charter of Paris, specially with regard to the 
rule of law, democracy and human rights;
- guarantees for the rights of the ethnic and national groups 
and minorities in accordance with the commitments subscri­
bed to in the framework of the CSCE, respect for the inviola- 
bilty of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful 
means by common agreement;
- acceptance of all relevant commitments with regard to disar­
mament and nuclear non-proliferation as well as to security 
and regional stability;
- commitment to settle by agreement, including where approp­
riate by recourse to arbitration, all questions concerning 
state succession and regional disputes.
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The Community and its member states will not recognize entities 
which are the result of aggression they would take into account of the 
effect or recognition on neighbouring states (95).
As the EC set its conditions for the recognition of breakaway re­
publics, it continued its efforts to find a political solution at least as a 
"confederation of sovereign states". But upon the failure to find a solu­
tion, they invited the break away republics to apply for recognition by 23 
December 1991, on condition th a t:
- They wish to be recognized as independent states,
- they accept the commitments mentioned before,
- they accept the provisions laid down in the draft Convention 
especially those in Chapter II as human rights of national or 
ethnic groups, under consideration by the conference on Yu­
goslavia (96).
The Community and its member states also require all former Yu­
goslav republics seeking independence to commit themselves, prior to re­
cognition, to adopt constitutional and political guarantees ensuring that 
they have no territorial claim towards a neighbouring community.lt sta­
ted that it conduct no hostile propaganda activities against a neighbou­
ring community state, including the use of a denomination which implies 
territorial claims (97). It would have recognized those states which met 
the requirements by 1 5 January 1992 (98) but Germany made the first 
move and recognized Slovenia and Croatia on 19 December 1991 (99).
Upon the application for recognition made by Slovenia, Macedo­
nia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Badinter Commission (100) wor-
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ked out on the applications for recognition and declared that:
- General international law required that states protect natio­
nal minorities within their territories ,
- while considering that there were some uncertainities about 
the law of self-determination, said that it was well-established 
that the implementation of self-determination did not involve 
modification of boundaries, except with the agreements of 
the states concerned. The Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia were 
not entitled to self-determination but rather to protection as 
national minorities within those areas, including to choosing 
their own nationality,
- the external frontiers of Yugoslavia had to be respected. In 
adddition the internal demarcations between Croatia and Ser­
bia and Bosnia and Serbia had to be respected in the absen­
ce of agreement to change them (101).
Upon these discussions Badinter Commission advised:
- That Slovenia and Macedonia satisfied the Foreign Ministers 
criteria,
- that there were doubts about the constitutional protection 
for minorities in Croatia but that Croatia had promised spee­
dy amendments which would repair the deficiency,
- that there was not clear evidence that the people of Bosnia 
wished to proceed to independence. The EC would consider 
recognizing Bosnia and Herzegovina only after a referendum 
on Bosnian independence had been held (102).
With the decision of the Badinter Commission, in a legal sense di-
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sintegration in Yugoslavia ended, although the recognition process and 
the clashes between the nationalities in Yugoslavia have been continuing, 
the secessionist process has been settled at least in its legal 
terminology.
2 .2 .4  Individual State Approach
During the Yugoslav crisis, Germany was the major state in Euro­
pe which was most clearly in favour of the right of self-determination. 
The German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher expressed that "the 
people of Yugoslavia alone may decide upon their future" (103) and 
threatened that "If a violent attempt is being made to change the inter­
nal borders of Yugoslavia, we have to consider recognizing Slovenia and 
Croatia's independence with a view to protecting these borders" (104). 
Germany was clearly in favor of the right of self-determination of the Yu­
goslav people but Germany had to depend on the "common foreign poli­
cy" approach of the European Community. Despite this, Germany could 
not wait and recognized the breakaway republics before the deadline set 
by the European Community.
Italy was also the supporter of the right of self-determination for 
the former Yugoslav peoples. Although its position was less clear, Presi­
dent Frencesco Cossiga stated that "Slovenia and Croatia could not be 
sacrificed for the sake of a united Yugoslavia" (105) which was a clear 
statement in favour of self determination. However, Foreign Minister 
Gianni de Michelis made it clear that Italy's position was bound to that of 
the EC (106), which showed that the government's sympathy for Yugos­
lavia's break away repuplics had limits.
Many European countries expressed their concern about the di­
sintegration of the Yugoslav Federation. With the old order collapsing.
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most Western European leaders quickly agreed that the status quo 
should be maintained as far as possible (107) and the Western govern­
ments, notably Spain, France and the United Kingdom, seemed to fear, 
that recognizing breakaway Yugoslav republics would encourage a se­
cessionist movement within their own borders (108). Yet Western Europe 
was interested in the symbol rather than reality of Yugoslavia and offe­
red confederation or association plans. This criticism of the break away 
Yugoslav republics occasionally went to ridiculous degree, one example 
being when tiny Luxembourg warned Slovenia and Croatia on behalf of 
the EC that they were too small to be viable independent countries 
(109).
During the crisis, permanent members of the United Nations Se­
curity Council, expressed their opposition to the disintegration of Yugos­
lavia: the US reaffirmed its policy of witholding recognition, pending on a 
peaceful and negotiated settlement, Russia, with its strong historical, cul­
tural and economic ties to Serbia, said that it was too soon to extend 
recognition; and China, which has its own secessionist movements in 
Tibet and elsewhere, took a similar position to that of Russia (110). The 
US Secretary of State, James Baker said that the US would not recogni­
ze Slovenia or Croatia as independent states, but spoke in favourable 
terms of the idea of Yugoslavia, becoming a loose alliance of states, and 
warned of the tragic consequences of the Yugoslav instability (111).
Even during the crisis the pre-coup Soviet government came 
close to threatening war if other countries, for any reason, decided to in­
tervene in Yugoslavia. A Soviet statement in early August 1991 referred 
to European considerations of peacekeeping forces in Croatia and war­
ned that "to enter on one side of the conflict would mean to come into 
conflict automatically with others inside and outside Yugoslavia" (112).
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France stressed that recognition for the republics is not enough to resol­
ve the crisis, for an agreement also has to be reached on borders 
(113).
As can be seen from these, the countries which were against the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia, can be divided into two main groups. The 
first group of countries like China were the ones which to any reason 
whatsoever would not recognize the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The 
other group of countries such as the United Kingdom and France, while 
not recognizing the disintegration of Yugoslavia, were the countries 
which were favouring a negotiated settlement for the crisis, namely con­
federation of Yugoslavia. In fact, by favouring confederation, they were 
favouring a solution that was not secesión but more like similar to parti­
tion.
Turkey, both as a Balkan country and respecting its Ottoman he­
ritage, from the beginning of the crisis actively participated in the discus- 
sions.Since the beginning of the crisis, Turkey stood aloof towards the 
secessionist entities, bearing in mind its own seperatist Kurdish problem, 
and supported the existence of Yugoslavia. The old federal structure 
was also seen as serving the interests of Yugoslav Muslims. In this con­
text ,Turkey did not refrain from criticizing the decision of Germany to 
recognize the republics of Slovenia and Croatia and stated that this 
would only speed up the process of disintegration in Yugoslavia,
But as the policy of the EC has become clear that it would recog­
nize Croatia and Slovenia upon the advisory opinion of the Badinter com­
mission, Turkey declared that it would recognize all the republics at 
about the same time but the recognition of Macedonia came a little bit 
later.
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As the crisis intensified and it became clear that Yugoslavia 
would not exist as one legal entity, the policy of those states that wete 
against the disintegration of Yugoslavia has changed towards the pro­
tection of the breakaway republic's territorial integrity. The foreign policy 
approach of the US has begun to change since January 1992. In a state­
ment issued after talks between the US Deputy Secretary of State Law­
rence Eagleburger and Yugoslav State Presidency member Borisav Jovic, 
Eagleburger stated that the "corrupt Yugoslav Presidency" cannot rep­
resent the interests of the whole country and continued by expressing 
that the US will not accept any outcome of the Yugoslav crisis that 
would be based on the use of force and intimidation to change the bor­
ders of Yugoslav republics (114).
After the failure of the coup d'etat in the Soviet Union, the count­
ry started to disintegrate, there was no longer a Soviet Union as existed 
before, and the biggest successor of the Soviet Union, namely the Rus­
sian Federation has changed its policy towards the crisis and in February 
1992 announced its intention of recognizing the breakaway republics. 
When Yuri Deryabin, the special envoy of Boris Yeltsin, was asked, if 
haste to recognize the breakaway republics was appropriate in the light 
of the process of disintegration in Russia itself, he answered "there is no 
direct link here" but added that" this decision does not influence Russia's 
stand point concerning the continuity and international status of Yugos­
lavia as a subject" (115). As can be seen from these examples, the app­
roach of states to the crisis mainly depended on the problems they face. 
Ethnicity and national interests of those countries, together with histori­
cal ties were the major determinants of their approach.
Claims for self-determination in the former Yugoslav federation 
can be divided into two distinct categories: The first involves a nation's
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claim to secede from the existing state such as Slovenes, Croats and 
create a new independent state as a juridicial person under international 
law. In the second category, claims for self-determination which has been 
expressed by the national minorities living in the former Yugoslav repub­
lics, such as the Serbs in Croatia and Albanians living in Serbia (Kosovo 
region) ,were not accepted by the EC and Western governments having 
the right to create new nation states. But the first category of claims 
were accepted.
During the crisis, the attitude of the Western countries towards 
the right of self-determination of the people of Yugoslavia was not very 
clear. At a deeper level, the debates reflected an unresolved dispute bet­
ween two conceptions," democracy and nationalism" (116). American, 
British and French leaders seem to want an international order based on 
citizenship above nationality, while German and Italian leaders apparently 
favour a revival of national self-determination, in which democracy is 
based on cultural identity (117). Germany, moreover was the only Wes­
tern democracy that had recent first hand experience in realizing the 
principle of self-determination, owing to its unification in 1990 (118). It 
was public opinion that had moved the German government to act in 
defence of self-determination of neighboring peoples (119). In the Yugos­
lav case, the countries that raised objections to the disintegration of Yu­
goslavia finally recognized the secessionist republics but it was the fear 
of a sustained civil war, not a commitment to the principle of self- 
determination that pushed them into recognizing Slovenia and Croatia 
(120). The Western governments finally accepted the secessionist repub­
lics as entities having the right to self-determination which is recognized 
for the breakaway republics under certain conditions:
- Territorial integrity of the breakaway republics must be based
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on previous federal borders,
- the right to self-determination was denied to the minorities li­
ving within those federal borders, including the autonomous republics, na­
mely Vojvodina and Kosovo,
- before breaking away as a seperate entity rights must be 
granted to minorities,
- if there is going to be a change on the borders of those repub­
lics, this must be based on a negotiated settlement.
But the Western European approach to the problem of Macedo- 
nic under Greek pressure represented a contradicition. Macedonia which 
satisfied all the conditions that the EC had put forward, was not recogni­
zed by the EC countries because of the objection of Greece to its name.
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CONCLUSION
It was not until the birth of democracy in its modern form and 
the birth of nationalism in the nineteenth century that the principle of self- 
determination came into existence. Although Wilson and Lenin champio­
ned the idea of self-determination at the beginning of twentieth century, 
their ideas were mainly based on their own political ideologies. The Lea­
gue of Nations saw the principle of self-determination under the context 
of settlement of disputes caused by World War I and this idea never 
spread to the colonial territories.
The concept of self-determination gained momentum with the 
establishment of the United Nations Organization and the decolonization 
process by the second half of the twentieth century .But the conflict 
upon the concept of self-determination has begun to arise with the de­
mand of the peoples living outside the colonized territories. The develo­
ped self-determination regime in the UN granted such rights only to the 
peoples of non-self-governing and colonized territories. Through various 
UN General Assembly resolutions this approach has been reiterated . The 
debate whether self-determination is a right in law or simply a political 
principle has not yet been solved. Conceptually, self-determination and 
secession are not opposite to each other. But, in practice, they have 
come to contradict each other. The secessionist cases of Katanga, and 
Bangladesh show that the international community of states has not yet 
been able to develop a criteria towards this concept. Instead, each re­
gional and cultural group developed its own criteria such as the uti possi­
detis of African, Muslim support toward secession when it represented 
Muslim minorities in non-Muslim countries, and more liberal approach 
from Western Europe towards the minority rights. Each region and cultu­
ral group developed its own policy depending on the problems they face.
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Utmost attention has been given to the protection of territorial 
integrity In the League of Nations and its successor of the states be­
cause it was necessary to establish an international order. In the League 
of Nations and its successor, the UN organization, attention has been 
given to the protection of territorial integrity of states. The UN G.A. Re­
solutions which dealt with the decolonization process have also dealt 
with the protection of territorial integrity of states and established a 
clear division between self-determination of colonies and territorial integ­
rity of sates by declaring that self-determination cannot be used for vio­
lating the territorial integrity of states . As in the case of Katanga, the 
UN organization used force to restore the territorial integrity of Congo, 
and in the case of Bangladesh there were discussions in the UN for pro­
tection of the territorial integrity of Pakistan as a whole but not for self- 
determination of the people of Bangladesh.
Other than the UN organization some territorial arrangements 
have also been made as the principle of uti possidetis in Africa. This prin­
ciple has been interpreted as applicable worldwide by the ICJ in the Burki- 
no Faso/Mali frontier dispute case. As well as international law and 
constitutional law also operated against secessionist attempts and used 
for the protection of territorial integrity of states.
The enmities which existed between the peoples living in Yugosla­
via were held under, for a while, with the establishment of a new federal 
Yugoslav state under the leadership of Tito. The 1974 Constitution re­
cognized the right of self-determination for the peoples of six federal re­
publics but failed to recognize this right for Albanians living in the Kosovo 
region who were more populous than Slovenians and Macedonians who 
had the right to self-determination. The Kosovo region was given the 
status of autnomous republic together with the Hungarians living in Voj- 
vodino. The federal constitution did not take into consideration the eth-
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nic divisions and many ethnic groups trapped in other federal republics,
With the death of Josip Broz Tito and the ending of the cold war 
era the delicate balance in Yugoslavia terminated .During the crisis, some 
ways were sought for the continuation of the Yugoslav state as a whole, 
but the decision of Slovene and Croat federal authorities continued in line 
with secession. As the central authorities attempt to find a negotiated 
settlement to the crisis failed, the JNA intervened to prevent the seces­
sion and the civil war broke out. When it become clear that secession 
was going to occur according to the federal borders, the Serbian mino­
rities living in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina wanted union with Serbia 
and they declared their own republics with the help of JNA. Secessions in 
Yugoslavia were born with their own secessionist cases. The cirisis has 
not ended but the four former republics of Yugoslava, namely Croatia, 
Slovenia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Hercegovina have decided to create 
their own independent states. Serbia and Montenegro have decided to 
continue as part of the Yugoslav republic.
The UN and the EC played an important role during the crisis. The 
initial policy of the UN was based on the preservation of the territorial in­
tegrity of Yugoslavia because some of its members, like China, feared 
that this would be a precedent for their secessionist movements. The 
problem in Yugoslavia was seen as a regional one and the initiative to 
solve the crisis was given to the European Community .The EC tried to 
prevent the disintegration of Yugoslavia but failed to form a common 
policy between its members towards the cirisis and fell hostage to the 
policy of Germany which recognized Croatia and Slovenia with fait ac­
compli. After the disintegration, the role of the UN was limited with provi­
ding peace keeping forces and organizing humanitarian aid in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and Croatia. On paper, the EC and the UN called for respect
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for the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia but when 
it came to practice they failed to take effective measures for the pro­
tection of the territorial integrity of these states.
The Yugoslav crisis has three main implications for international 
law. First of all the African context of the principle of uti possidetis was 
applied to a case outside the African peninsula for the first time. We 
have mentioned before that it has been applied in the Burkino Faso/Mali 
case and declared by the ICJ that it had become one of universal appli­
cation. The principle of uti possidetis applied to the Yugoslav case after 
the secession of the republics. Untill the Yugoslav cirisis uti possidetis 
applied to the cases before the secession took place in order to pro­
tect the territorial integrity of states. But in the Yugoslav case this prin­
ciple did not apply to prevent the disintegration of Yugoslavia but in 
order to protect the territorial integrity of newly secessed entities Its 
aplication outside the context of Africa has shown us that it had become 
a precedent for future secessionist entities. The Yugoslav case has 
shown us that frontiers can only be changed through negotiated settle­
ment, if not the principle of uti possidetis applies to the case.
The second contribution of the Yugoslav case is the issue of mi­
norities. During the decolonization process there was no special empha­
sis for the protection of minority rights. But with the Yugoslav case this 
issue has gained importance and protection of minority rights were put 
as a precondition before recognition. The Badinter commission declared 
that the Serbian population in Bosnia-Flerzegovina and Croatia were en­
titled to all the rights accorded to minorities and ethnic groups under in­
ternational law and the secessionist entities which do not satisfy this cri­
teria will not be recognized. This has shown that the protection of the 
rights of minorities has become an important criteria for the seceding 
entities.
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The third one is a very controversial issue. Before the crisis only 
the peoples of colonies and non-self-governing territories were regarded 
as having the right of self-determination. . For the first time, a federal 
entity disintegrated without the approval of the federal authorities and 
this was approved by the UN and the EC. This case contradicts with the 
secessionist crisis in the Federal State of Nigeria, where the demands of 
the Biafrans were not recognized. Now we can put forward that Yugos­
lavia created a precendent for the future federalist cases. As the Yugos­
lav case has shown us we have not yet been able to develop internatio­
nal law with a universal application to the question of "which people 
qualifies for self-determination."
Those breakaway republics are now the members of the world 
community of states and become members of many international organi­
zations such as the UN, non-aligned movement, but some countries abs­
tained to recognize those secessionist republics. For example in early 
March 1992 when the Croatian foreign misiter Zvonimir Separovic visited 
the Far East, he failed to obtain recognition from China, which was con­
cerned with own secessionist movements in Tibet and Sinkiang (Eastern 
Türkistan) (1).
The disintegration process in Yugoslavia raised many questions. 
The most important of all, whether secession of those republics will trig­
ger a worldwide epidemic of successful secessions and a wave of new 
states? But we have to take into account that there exists almost limit­
less numbers of ethnic communities and peoples, and the globe is too 
small to provide each of them full sovereignty over a piece of land (2). A 
compromise is hard to be reached on a global level. On the other hand, 
at the regional level, at least in Europe, the issue of revision of borders 
has been accepted, through the mutual consent of the countries through
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a negotiated settlement (3). But at other regional perspectives, such a 
concept has not been developed. As the British Foreign Secretary Doug­
las Hurd explains, "We all know that boundaries can be artificial, they can 
be inconvenient, but those of us who have studied these matters know 
that when the countries of Africa became independent they laid down in 
the Organization of African Unity the wise principle that despite the artifi­
ciality, ... those boundaries should be respected" (4). But according to 
him this does not mean that some entities will not have such a right; 
"well defined entities like the Baltic republics could reach independence 
through negotiation" (5). There is nothing in international law to suggest 
that the international community could have any legitimate objection to a 
negotiated settlement for any secessionist conflict, namely partition. Fe­
deral structures are not limited only to Eastern Europe, they exist on all 
regional state structure. In a decentralized world in which the effective 
power of participants is patently discrepant, decisions in support of or in 
rejection of particular claims of self-determination will remain essentially 
decentralized, in the absence of collective decision (6).
The territorial status-quo which had been shaped during the Cold 
War years has changed. But there are no signs that the changes in the 
established normative structure will apply to the cases other than those 
in Europe .The call of the Iraqi Kurds ,Tibetans, Turkish Cypriots and 
other peoples for self-determination remains unanswered under the con­
cept of territorial integrity of states. Besides, there is no indication that 
the territorial status-quo established in Africa during the decolonization 
period is on the verge of change. One can claim that Eritrean independen­
ce is an example for such a change. The special status of Eritrean terri­
tory conflicts with this. Eritrea was originally a non-self-governing territo­
ry, hence, a self determination unit. Initially the UN formed a federation
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between Eritrea and Ethiopia. In 1962, Eritrea was annexed by Ethiopia 
and became a province of Ethiopia. Since then, the civil war had been 
going on and it was won by the Eritreans. Then with a plebiscite which 
was supervised by the UN, the Eritreans decided for independence Becau­
se of this special status of the territory, one has to approach this case 
with caution.Another similar case is the annexation of East Timor by In­
donesia which was a non-self-governing territory. The UN did not recogni­
ze the annexation and called for respect for self-determination and the 
territorial integrity of the people living in East Timor. The problem is still 
continuing and has not yet been solved in legal terms. The UN approach 
to these cases is limited with non-self-governing territories and self- 
determination is regarded as a right only for the peoples living in such 
territories.
For the future, there seems to be common points that can be 
reached on the global level, without violating the territorial integrity of 
states. Every secession is born with its own secessionist demand and 
may face problems in the future, because minorities are also trapped in 
those states such as the Serbian minority in Croatia, Russian minority in 
Moldavia and so on. Instead of giving every ethnic group a right to es­
tablish their seperate state, the world community of states can establish 
some common norms for the protection of these minorities' cultural and 
democratic demands without violating the territorial integrity of those 
states.
We have been able to agree on some fundamentals in the CSCE, 
the Council of Europe and, to some extent in the United Nations — name­
ly, to tolerate and indeed respect the diverse cultures in a country, to 
promote the rights as well as the identity of culturally distinct minorities; 
and to regard cultural pluralism as essential to a democratic society (7).
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In this respect, we can expect a development of the concept of "inter­
nal" aspect of self-determination on a global level. But it must not be for­
gotten that, self-determination is not a one shot affair. The attainment 
of internal aspect of self-determination does not foreclose human aspira­
tions to search for independence. Self-determination is an ongoing pro­
cess for peoples to forge and express their shared identity and destiny 
under ever-changing conditions (8). Therefore a delicate balance which 
will prevent any future clashes must be established between the self- 
determination of peoples and the territorial integrity of states.
As can be seen, conservatism towards the concept of self- 
determination still continues. Each region has different interpretations of 
the concepts of the territorial integrity of states and self-determination 
of peoples. In Europe, there is a more liberal approach towards minority 
rights and self-determination of peoples, but in Africa and other Third 
World countries the artifical borders and the undemocratic nature of go- 
verments remain as a barrier between these concepts. Other than the 
CSCE mechanism, there is not an effective organization for the protec­
tion of minority rights on a global level. Therefore, in the near future, de­
mands for self-determination will be interpreted on regional level, depen­
ding on the region's political problems and interests.
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